- Title Pages
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Why Economics Needs Ethical Theory
- Chapter 2 The Sen System of Social Evaluation
- Chapter 3 The Good Life and the Good Economy<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 4 The Adaptation Problem, Evolution and Normative Economics<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 5 Rights and Interests
- Chapter 6 Elements of a Theory of the Right to Development<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 7 Rational Choice on General Domains<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 8 Some Remarks on the Ranking of Infinite Utility Streams<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 9 Individual Choices in a Non‐Consequentialist Framework<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 10 The Method of Majority Decision and Rationality Conditions<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 11 Convexity and Separability in Representing Consensus
- Chapter 12 Rights, Individual Preferences and Collective Rationality
- Chapter 13 Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 14 Limited Rights and Social Choice Rules<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 15 Dominance Criteria for Critical‐Level Generalized Utilitarianism<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 16 The Measurement of Capabilities<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 17 On Ultrapoverty<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 18 Multidimensional Poverty Orderings<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 19 External Capabilities<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 20 On the Welfarist Rationale for Relative Poverty Lines<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 21 Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 22 Ungrouping Income Distributions
- Chapter 23 A Practical Proposal for Simplifying the Measurement of Income Poverty<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 24 Concepts and Measures of Agency<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 25 Sen's Identities
- Chapter 26 Welfare Economics and Giving for Development<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 27 Equity and Sharing the Cost of a Public Project<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 28 Isolation, Assurance and Rules<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 29 Simple Formulae for Optimal Income Taxation and the Measurement of Inequality<sup>*</sup>
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects
Isolation, Assurance and Rules *
Isolation, Assurance and Rules *
CAN RATIONAL FOLLY SUPPLANT FOOLISH RATIONALITY?
- Chapter:
- (p.523) Chapter 28 Isolation, Assurance and Rules^{*}
- Source:
- Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen
- Author(s):
Peter Hammond
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
In an ‘isolation paradox’ game whose many players have identical preferences, conforming to a rule which maximizes average utility is individually a strictly dominated strategy. Suppose, however, some players think ‘quasi-magically’, or in accordance with evidential (but not causal) decision theory. They act as though believing that others' behavior is correlated with (but not caused by) their own disposition to conform, or not. Standard game theory excludes such ‘folly’. Yet it can rationalize ‘rule utilitarian’ cooperative behaviour. Comparisons are made with Newcomb's problem and related attempts to resolve the Prisoner's dilemma, as well as with an approach to eliciting players' subjective beliefs about other players' strategies in any normal form game.
Keywords: rationality, collective action, evidential decision theory, rule utilitarianism, subjective probabilities in games, Prisoner's dilemma, Newcomb's problem
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- Title Pages
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Why Economics Needs Ethical Theory
- Chapter 2 The Sen System of Social Evaluation
- Chapter 3 The Good Life and the Good Economy<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 4 The Adaptation Problem, Evolution and Normative Economics<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 5 Rights and Interests
- Chapter 6 Elements of a Theory of the Right to Development<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 7 Rational Choice on General Domains<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 8 Some Remarks on the Ranking of Infinite Utility Streams<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 9 Individual Choices in a Non‐Consequentialist Framework<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 10 The Method of Majority Decision and Rationality Conditions<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 11 Convexity and Separability in Representing Consensus
- Chapter 12 Rights, Individual Preferences and Collective Rationality
- Chapter 13 Irrelevant Alternatives
- Chapter 14 Limited Rights and Social Choice Rules<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 15 Dominance Criteria for Critical‐Level Generalized Utilitarianism<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 16 The Measurement of Capabilities<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 17 On Ultrapoverty<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 18 Multidimensional Poverty Orderings<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 19 External Capabilities<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 20 On the Welfarist Rationale for Relative Poverty Lines<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 21 Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 22 Ungrouping Income Distributions
- Chapter 23 A Practical Proposal for Simplifying the Measurement of Income Poverty<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 24 Concepts and Measures of Agency<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 25 Sen's Identities
- Chapter 26 Welfare Economics and Giving for Development<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 27 Equity and Sharing the Cost of a Public Project<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 28 Isolation, Assurance and Rules<sup>*</sup>
- Chapter 29 Simple Formulae for Optimal Income Taxation and the Measurement of Inequality<sup>*</sup>
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects