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Hegelian Metaphysics$
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Robert Stern

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199239108

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.001.0001

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Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal

Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal

Chapter:
(p.143) 5 Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal
Source:
Hegelian Metaphysics
Author(s):

Robert Stern (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.003.0006

This chapter explores the way in which the British idealists took up Hegel's notion of the ‘concrete universal’. At the interpretative level, it argues that while not everything these idealists are taken to mean by the term is properly to be found in Hegel, their work nonetheless relates to a crucial and genuine strand in Hegel's position. And at a philosophical level, the question underlying the doctrine of the concrete universal is examined: namely, how far does our thought involve a mere abstraction from reality, and what are the metaphysical and epistemological implications if it turns out it does not?

Keywords:   concrete universal, thought, reality, abstraction

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