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Hegelian Metaphysics$
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Robert Stern

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199239108

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.001.0001

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Hegel's Idealism

Hegel's Idealism

Chapter:
(p.45) 1 Hegel's Idealism
Source:
Hegelian Metaphysics
Author(s):

Robert Stern (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239108.003.0002

The nature of Hegel's idealism has been much disputed, and this chapter offers an account of it that is distinctive. Against recent commentators such as Robert Pippin, it is argued that Hegel was not a Kantian or transcendental idealist. It is also argued that Hegel was not a mentalistic idealist, offering a kind of ‘spirit monism’ that reduced the world to mind. Instead Hegel understood idealism to be the view that ‘the finite has no veritable being’, where this leads to a position according to which thought cannot grasp what truly exists through experience but only through a kind of rationalist theorizing, and that this in turn requires us to accept a form of realism about concepts. This conceptual realism makes up the core of Hegel's idealism, understood as the anti-nominalist doctrine that reality is structured by concepts that render it accessible to thought.

Keywords:   Kant, realism, transcendental idealism, Hegel's idealism, conceptual realism, nominalism, Robert Pippin

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