Making the EMU: The Politics of Budgetary Surveillance and the Enforcement of Maastricht
James D. Savage
Abstract
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Growth Pact demand that EU member states comply with their famous deficit and debt requirements of three and sixty per cent of GDP. Yet, how can the EU's leaders be certain that these targets are met? Is a three percent deficit in Belgium equivalent to one in Italy or France? This book explores how the Maastricht Treaty's budgetary surveillance procedure monitors member state budgetary policies, harmonizes their budgetary data, and effectively determines which member states qualified for member status and are subject to the Pact's sanctions. This book pr ... More
The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Growth Pact demand that EU member states comply with their famous deficit and debt requirements of three and sixty per cent of GDP. Yet, how can the EU's leaders be certain that these targets are met? Is a three percent deficit in Belgium equivalent to one in Italy or France? This book explores how the Maastricht Treaty's budgetary surveillance procedure monitors member state budgetary policies, harmonizes their budgetary data, and effectively determines which member states qualified for member status and are subject to the Pact's sanctions. This book provides an examination of how the EU entrusted the credibility of these critical budgetary figures to a relatively minor European Commission agency, and what effect the surveillance procedure has on the making of the EMU and the enforcement of Maastricht.
Keywords:
Maastricht Treaty,
Stability Growth Pact,
European Union,
budgetary surveillance,
budgetary data,
European Monetary Union
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2007 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780199238699 |
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238699.001.0001 |