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Law and Philosophy$
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Michael Freeman and Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237159

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.001.0001

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Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology

Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology

Chapter:
(p.60) 4 Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology
Source:
Law and Philosophy
Author(s):

John Oberdiek

Dennis Patterson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.003.0004

Analytic general jurisprudence has become increasingly attentive to its own methodology in recent years. No longer content with its traditional first-order questions revolving around the varieties, commitments, and defensibility of legal positivism, the discipline of jurisprudence has raised a second-order methodological question: How should one do jurisprudence? This chapter introduces the methodology debate, draws attention to the merits and shortcomings of various positions already staked out, and contributes to the debate by defending the claims that moral evaluation has a modest role in analysing the concept of law and that conceptual analysis, or rather, many of its incarnations, is defensible and indeed inescapable in jurisprudence.

Keywords:   jurisprudence, moral evaluation, conceptual analysis

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