Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Law and Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Freeman and Ross Harrison

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199237159

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 December 2019

Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual Analysis, the Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy *

Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual Analysis, the Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy *

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual Analysis, the Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy*
Source:
Law and Philosophy
Author(s):

Kenneth Einar Himma

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199237159.003.0001

This chapter responds to the most important considerations adduced against traditional conceptual analysis (TCA): (1) the denial of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths; (2) recent research on the fallibility of ordinary intuitions; (3) the idea that all claims are revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience; and (4) the claim that even putatively conceptual claims are contingent in character. It argues that the most influential arguments for abandoning metaphysics and conceptual analysis are unsuccessful. For instance, the Quinean circle-of-terms argument, does not even get off the ground because his claim we should give up the concept of meaning because of its obscurity cannot bear the weight Quine places on it. Likewise, sociological arguments about the unreliability of intuition fail because they neither distinguish various forms of intuition nor consider the possibility that some forms are more reliable than others.

Keywords:   traditional conceptual analysis, Quine, Two Dogmas

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .