This chapter discusses two classical objections to the view that the content of a tensed utterance is a ‘temporal proposition’, true relative to certain times and false relative to others. The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. In response, it is argued that the (complete) content of a representation is distributed over its explicit content and the circumstance with respect to which that content is to be evaluated. As a result, the explicit content (lekton) need not be fully propositional; it may determine only relative truth-conditions. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who claimed that temporal propositions cannot be the object of propositional attitudes such as belief. It is argued that that argument can be resisted if one distinguishes two aspects in a belief and, correlatively, two interpretations for a belief report. The last section of the chapter briefly discusses ‘faultless disagreement’.
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