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Vagueness and Degrees of Truth$
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Nicholas J. J. Smith

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199233007

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.001.0001

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Who's Afraid of Degrees of Truth?

Who's Afraid of Degrees of Truth?

Chapter:
(p.209) 5 Who's Afraid of Degrees of Truth?
Source:
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth
Author(s):

Nicholas J. J. Smith (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.003.0006

This chapter considers objections to the fuzzy view of vagueness in particular, and to degree-theoretic treatments of vagueness in general. These objections are that the very idea of truth coming in degrees is in some way confused or mistaken; that fuzzy theory involves an objectionable violation of classical logic; that degrees of truth cannot be integrated with key developments elsewhere in philosophy of language, outside the study of vagueness; that degree theories which treat the logical connectives as truth functions cannot account for ordinary usage of, and/or intuitions about the truth and/or assertibility of, compound sentences about borderline cases; and that denying bivalence leads to contradiction.

Keywords:   classical logic, assertibility, truth functionality, bivalence, fuzzy logic

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