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Vagueness and Degrees of Truth$
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Nicholas J. J. Smith

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199233007

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Nicholas J. J. Smith (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the use of the term ‘vague’ in philosophy. It presents three characteristics of vague predicates: they give rise to borderline cases; their extensions have blurry boundaries; and they generate Sorites paradoxes. It then explains the goal of studying of vagueness, which is gain an account of the semantics of vague predicates — an account of what the meaning of such a predicate consists in, and of how (if at all) it differs from the meaning of a precise predicate. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.

Keywords:   vagueness, predicates, philosophy, blurry boundaries, Sorites paradoxes

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