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Truth in Virtue of MeaningA Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction$
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Gillian Russell

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199232192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001

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Beyond Modality

Beyond Modality

Chapter:
(p.71) 3 Beyond Modality
Source:
Truth in Virtue of Meaning
Author(s):

Gillian Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.003.0004

A final problem left over from the previous chapter is that of substantive necessity. How are we to distinguish substantively necessary sentences from analytic ones? This problem arises because we have attempted to characterise analyticity in modal terms. This chapter proposes a more fine-grained ‘metaphysical picture’ of analyticity to underlie the rougher modal approximation developed in Chapter 2.

Keywords:   direct reference, structured propositions, reference determiner, containment, synonymy, rigidity, analyticity, pseudo-analyticity

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