The traditional account of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on a naive folk theory of language. This chapter explains how that folk theory supported a particular version of the analytic/synthetic distinction. It then provides alternatives to the folk picture and argues that we should distinguish four different kinds of meaning: character, content, reference determiner, and referent. This more fine-grained picture allows us to reconstruct analyticity as truth in virtue of reference determiner, which is more easily defended against the old arguments against analyticity. This move also solves the worry about equating analytic sentences with those that express necessary truths, and allows us to account for the status of the contingent analytic and the necessary a posteriori.
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