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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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Disjunctivism and Discriminability

Disjunctivism and Discriminability

Chapter:
(p.181) 7 Disjunctivism and Discriminability
Source:
Disjunctivism
Author(s):

A. D. Smith

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0008

Disjunctivists typically claim that something is a hallucination if it is an experience that is not a perception, but that the subject cannot tell, just in virtue of having the experience and ‘introspecting’ it, whether it is not a perception. This chapter argues that there are states that are not hallucinations, as this term is usually understood, but that meet the condition of being thus subjectively indiscriminable from perception. Such states are not hallucinations, since they are not even sensory in character. A modification to the condition is finally introduced that improves matters, but does not entirely avoid counter-examples. In the course of the chapter a position that is termed ‘extreme disjunctivism’ is discussed. This position is particularly unfitted to accommodate the counter-examples.

Keywords:   hallucination, experience, perception, indiscriminability, sensory

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