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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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On How to Act—Disjunctively

On How to Act—Disjunctively

Chapter:
(p.262) 11 On How to Act—Disjunctively
Source:
Disjunctivism
Author(s):

Jonathan Dancy (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0012

This chapter reconsiders Dancy's (2000) rejection of a disjunctive account of acting for a reason. It starts with a brief account of the marks of disjunctivism in general, to be used as a template, with special attention to issues raised in Dancy (1995) where it was suggested that the second disjunct of perceptual disjunctivism might be expressed substantially rather than merely as a state indistinguishable from the first disjunct. The chapter then considers the motivations behind a disjunctive account of acting for a reason, and also various other ways in which such accounts might be phrased, before concluding that none of them is successful. They are all either empirically false or philosophically challengeable. The suggestions made by Hornsby in her paper for the conference in Glasgow — of which this volume is in part a record — which amount to a disjunctive conception of ‘A φ-ed because she believed that p’, are then considered and it is argued that this account cannot be sustained. In a final section, Martin's reasons for insisting that the second disjunct in disjunctive accounts of experience must be conceived as whatever is indistinguishable from a perception, and not in more substantial terms, is considered one more time, and rejected.

Keywords:   disjunctivism, action, reasons, indistinguishability, perception, Hornsby, Dancy

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