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DisjunctivismPerception, Action, Knowledge$
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Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199231546

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001

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Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

(p.1) Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism

Adrian Haddock (Contributor Webpage)

Fiona Macpherson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This introductory chapter argues that there are a number of different varieties of disjunctivism. But it is suggested that a mark of disjunctivism, in all of its varieties, is a refusal to credit a certain kind of significance to the fact that a pair of states can be indistinguishable from the subject's point of view. Three different varieties of disjunctivism about experience are introduced: experiential disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in intrinsic nature; epistemological disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in epistemic significance; and phenomenal disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in phenomenal character. A comparison is made with disjunctivism about bodily movement, and disjunctivism about reasons for acting. It is suggested that each variety of disjunctivism stands opposed to a Cartesian picture of the relation between the inner and the outer worlds.

Keywords:   perception, action, knowledge, mind, epistemology, indistinguishability, experience, phenomenal character, bodily movement, reasons

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