- Title Pages
- List of Contributors
- 1 Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge
- 2 Is There a Value Problem?
- 3 Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
- 4 The Value of Understanding
- 5 Ugly Analyses and Value
- 6 The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
- 7 Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
- 8 Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
- 9 Luck, Knowledge, and Control
- 10 Values of Truth and Truth of Values
- 11 Epistemic Normativity
- 12 Curiosity and the Value of Truth
- 13 The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth
- APPENDIX A Precis of <i>The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding</i>
- APPENDIX B The Value Problem
- APPENDIX C Is Understanding Factive?
- APPENDIX D Understanding, Knowledge, and the <i>Meno</i> Requirement
- APPENDIX E Responses to Critics
- (p.1) Introduction
- Epistemic Value
Alan Millar (Contributor Webpage)
Adrian Haddock (Contributor Webpage)
Duncan Pritchard (Contributor Webpage)
- Oxford University Press
The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.
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