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Occasion-SensitivitySelected Essays$
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Charles Travis

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199230334

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.001.0001

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Are Belief Ascriptions Opaque?

Are Belief Ascriptions Opaque?

Chapter:
(p.185) 8 Are Belief Ascriptions Opaque?
Source:
Occasion-Sensitivity
Author(s):

Charles Travis (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230334.003.0009

This chapter reviews some of what is known about belief ascriptions. It does not settle whether there are opaque ones, since it is not known what would be needed to know to decide that. The chapter also argues that the usual reasons for finding (some) such ascriptions opaque are bad ones, as are the usual accounts of what such opacity would come to. In fact, there is more than just a possibility that in this area, our notions of opacity such as they are, break down.

Keywords:   opacity, pseudo-opacity, Quine, opaque

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