This chapter argues that bivalence does not hold, as conceived by Tim Williamson. Bivalence, on Williamson's conception, seems essential to (the motivation for) his own account of vagueness. As for meaning, the problem, this chapter puts forth, is to locate Williamson's view of that. In fact, he has suggested two views, which move in opposing directions. One of Williamson's suggested views severs the link one finds, for example, in Donald Davidson (e.g., 1967) between what words mean and the conditions under which they would be true (of something). The other view has the same shape as a later view of Davidson's (1983), and, for the same reasons, will not do.
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