Attitudes As States
Attitudes As States
A recurrent theme emerges in Wittgenstein. Its subjects are meaning, understanding, and attitudes such as expecting, believing, hoping, and intending. The point is not that there is no good sense in which such things are mental states. It is rather that so thinking of them suggests false pictures. Which ones? At least two. This chapter explores just one, and only for belief.
Keywords: Frege, Wittgenstein, false pictures, belief
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