Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
A Confusion of the SpheresKierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199229826

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229826.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 October 2019

Sense and Ineffabilia—Kierkegaard and the Tractatus

Sense and Ineffabilia—Kierkegaard and the Tractatus

(p.84) 3 Sense and Ineffabilia—Kierkegaard and the Tractatus
A Confusion of the Spheres

Genia Schönbaumsfeld (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein, but the exposure of a doctrine of ‘substantial nonsense’ (or of ineffable truth) isn't one of them. For whilst Wittgenstein is clearly committed to the notion of ineffabilia in the Tractatus, Climacus'/Kierkegaard's project in Postscript has nothing whatever to do with such a conception. A profound disanalogy therefore exists, in this respect, between the early Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. The points of contact that can therefore be perceived between the early Wittgenstein and the Danish philosopher cannot be located in the actual endorsement (or rejection) of similar views about the nature of language and what lies beyond its limits, but are rather to be found in a certain commonality of vision as regards ethics and religion.

Keywords:   absolute paradox, James Conant, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, Mere nonsense, Revocation, substantial nonsense, Tractatus, Wittgenstein, saying and showing

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .