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Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy$
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P. J. E. Kail

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199229505

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229505.001.0001

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The Golden: Relational Values, Realism and A Moral Sense

The Golden: Relational Values, Realism and A Moral Sense

Chapter:
(p.204) 9 The Golden: Relational Values, Realism and A Moral Sense
Source:
Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy
Author(s):

P. J. E. Kail (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229505.003.0009

This chapter shows how the projection of pleasure and pain can be integrated into a subtle form of realism. It is argued that Hume's account of the moral sense can be seen as modelled on a view of primitive animal cognition, whereby what is good for the animal is made salient in pleasurable experience; what is bad for it through painful experience. The moral pleasure and pains render salient Hume's catalogue of the morally relational values, namely that which is useful or pleasing.

Keywords:   utility, pleasure, pain, detection, secondary qualities, realism

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