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Nature's MetaphysicsLaws and Properties$
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Alexander Bird

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199227013

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001

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(p.66) 4 Categoricalism
Nature's Metaphysics

Alexander Bird (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental natural properties are categorical — they have no nomic or causal essences. Categoricalism is explored as a conception of properties and as a basis for accounts of laws of nature. The commitment of categoricalism to quidditism is explained and criticized. Categoricalist accounts of the laws of nature — the regularity theory (and Humean supervenience) and nomic necessitation — are each shown in turn to face serious objections.

Keywords:   quidditism, regularity theory, nomic necessitation, Humean supervenience, Categoricalism, law of nature

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