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Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199226078

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 13 November 2019

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

(p.187) 8 Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement

Alvin I. Goldman (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that there is a plausible though non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is compatible with objectivism or absolutism. The key element of this conception is that people in different communities can justifiably accept different principles about reasoning. As a result, people with the same first-order (‘material’) evidence for a proposition can have divergent but reasonable attitudes toward it.

Keywords:   disagreement, epistemic relativism, objectivism, principles of reasoning

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