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Disagreement$
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Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199226078

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001

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Belief in the Face of Controversy

Belief in the Face of Controversy

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 Belief in the Face of Controversy
Source:
Disagreement
Author(s):

Hilary Kornblith (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0003

This chapter examines differences among disagreements in different domains. It notes that in some domains disagreements usually can be readily resolved, in others consensus often emerges over time. However, it is argued that the dynamics of consensus building in philosophy is quite dissimilar to what is found in mathematics and science. These considerations lead to the conclusion that philosophical beliefs held in the face of peer disagreement are typically not justified.

Keywords:   disagreement, disagreement in philosophy, consensus, justification

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