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Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199226078

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001

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We're Right. They're Wrong

We're Right. They're Wrong

(p.10) 1 We're Right. They're Wrong

Peter Van Inwagen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter introduces many of the central philosophical puzzles about peer disagreement. It starts with a discussion of disagreements in religion, and then extends the discussion to philosophical, political, and other disagreements. It assesses arguments for and against the skeptical view that the symmetry present in cases of peer disagreements makes suspension of judgment the appropriate attitude. The author of the chapter is unable to give up his beliefs in many of these cases and unable to accept the conclusion that his own beliefs are not rational, but is also unable to answer satisfactorily the arguments for the skeptical view.

Keywords:   disagreement, peer disagreement, exclusivism, rationality

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