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Disagreement$
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Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199226078

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001

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The Moral Evil Demons

The Moral Evil Demons

Chapter:
(p.216) 9 The Moral Evil Demons
Source:
Disagreement
Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0010

This chapter discusses moral disagreement and moral relativism, and places the long-standing discussion of these issues in the context of recent discussions of the epistemology of disagreement. It argues that it is rational to have a special sort of ‘fundamental trust’ in one's own moral intuitions, but it is not even possible to have the same sort of trust in the intuitions of others. As a result, it can be rational for both parties to a peer disagreement to have more confidence in their own views than in the incompatible views of their peers.

Keywords:   moral disagreement, moral relativism, intuitions, self-trust, rationality

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