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Oughts and ThoughtsScepticism and the Normativity of Meaning$
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Anandi Hattiangadi

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199219025

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction
Source:
Oughts and Thoughts
Author(s):

Anandi Hattiangadi (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0001

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of the book, which is to defend semantic realism against Kripke's sceptical attack. According to the semantic realist, to understand the meaning of a word (mental representation) is to know its correctness conditions, and that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions. Semantic realism, on this definition, is compatible with a variety of metaphysical theories of which grasp of correctness conditions or truth conditions consist in. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.

Keywords:   Kripke, sceptical argument, semantic realism, word meaning, sentence meaning, metaphysics

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