Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Normative WebAn Argument for Moral Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Terence Cuneo

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218837

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 August 2019

Epistemic Nihilism

Epistemic Nihilism

Chapter:
(p.115) 4 Epistemic Nihilism
Source:
The Normative Web
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0005

Epistemic antirealist views are rarely explicitly formulated. This chapter formulates and engages with the epistemic counterpart to so-called error theories in morality, such as that defended by J. L. Mackie. Epistemic nihilism, as it is termed, is committed to the claim that there are no epistemic facts. It is argued that this type of view yields a radical type of scepticism, according to which there is no reason to believe the view itself or anything else, for that matter.

Keywords:   antirealist views, error theory, J. L. Mackie, Moorean paradox, scepticism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .