Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Normative WebAn Argument for Moral Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Terence Cuneo

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218837

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 December 2019

The Parity Premise

The Parity Premise

Chapter:
(p.89) 3 The Parity Premise
Source:
The Normative Web
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0004

This chapter contains the second stage of argument for the core argument's first premise. The strategy employed is to point out that that there is a class of standard objections ordinarily leveled against the claim that moral facts exist. These objections purport to establish that were moral facts to exist, then they would display what are called the ‘objectionable features’ — properties such as being intrinsically motivating, being categorically reason-giving, being explanatorily idle, and so forth. Were the standard objections to establish this, the claim is that when suitably modified, they would also establish that were epistemic facts to exist, then they too would exhibit the objectionable features. These two claims allow us to formulate the following direct argument for the core argument's first premise: if moral facts do not exist, then this is simply because they would display the objectionable features. But there is nothing about moral facts in particular that makes their having these features objectionable; it is the character of the features themselves that renders moral facts problematic. Accordingly, we can affirm: if moral facts do not exist, then nothing has the objectionable features. However, if epistemic facts exist, then there is something that has the objectionable features. Or, otherwise put: if nothing has the objectionable features, then epistemic facts do not exist. From this it follows that the core argument's first premise is true: (1) if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.

Keywords:   categorical reasons, moral motivation, objectionable features, standard antirealist arguments, supervenience, epistemic facts, moral facts

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .