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Truth as One and Many$
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Michael P. Lynch

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218738

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001

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Applying the View: Moral Truth

Applying the View: Moral Truth

Chapter:
(p.159) 8 Applying the View: Moral Truth
Source:
Truth as One and Many
Author(s):

Michael P. Lynch (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.003.0009

This book has argued that truth is a functional property that can be manifested differently in distinct domains of inquiry. This chapter looks at how truth is manifested in one such domain: our thoughts about morality. It argues that the truth of moral propositions is manifested by an epistemically constrained property — the property of concordance.

Keywords:   cognitivism, moral propositions, morality, supercoherence, concordance, relativism

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