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Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

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Substance Causation, Persons, and Free Will

Substance Causation, Persons, and Free Will

Chapter:
(p.159) 8 Substance Causation, Persons, and Free Will
Source:
Personal Agency
Author(s):

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0009

This chapter more fully explains why all causation is fundamentally substance causation — that is, causation by ‘individual substances’, or persisting, concrete objects — rather than causation by events. It is then explained how the versions of substance dualism in the philosophy of mind and libertarianism in the philosophy of action that are defended in the book can be very naturally accommodated within a view of the physical world which takes seriously the fundamental status of substance causation.

Keywords:   dualism, events, libertarianism, powers

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