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Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

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Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation

Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation

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(p.58) 3 Physical Causal Closure and the Invisibility of Mental Causation
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Personal Agency
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E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0004

This chapter develops more detailed models of mental causation of the kinds adumbrated, and explains why, if such models are correct, it should nonetheless appear to be the case, from the perspective of physical scientists, that all of the causation involved in human behaviour is purely physical in character. In other words, it is explained why mental causation, thus conceived, should be invisible from such a perspective — the implication being, of course, that its invisibility should not be regarded as compelling evidence of its non-existence. In this manner, it is hoped to take some of the wind out the sails of those physicalists who presume uncritically that ‘science is on their side’.

Keywords:   invisibility, physicalism, physical science, human behaviour

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