This chapter formulates several criticisms of the analogies of Social Trinitarianism, particularly Craig's. It questions whether there could even be such a thing as Cerberus at all. It argues that because Social Trinitarianism's ‘whole’ Triune God is not, strictly speaking, a person, God cannot perform the intentional actions of creation and redemption. Because God is not a person, God cannot know, choose, or act at all. It concludes that such a God cannot be considered worship-worthy. It contends that genuine monotheism holds that there is one God, that something can be a God without exemplifying the property of being triune and that nothing can be a God without exemplifying a nature that includes the property of being a person.
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