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Greening Aid?Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance$
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Robert L. Hicks, Bradley C. Parks, J. Timmons Roberts, and Michael J. Tierney

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199213948

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213948.001.0001

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The Political Market for Environmental Aid: Why Some Donors are Greener Than Others

The Political Market for Environmental Aid: Why Some Donors are Greener Than Others

Chapter:
(p.159) 6 The Political Market for Environmental Aid: Why Some Donors are Greener Than Others
Source:
Greening Aid?
Author(s):

Robert L. Hicks

Bradley C. Parks (Contributor Webpage)

J. Timmons Roberts (Contributor Webpage)

Michael J. Tierney (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213948.003.0006

This chapter tests four sets of possible explanations for why countries give bilateral environmental aid, and for why they give relatively less aid with likely environmentally harmful impacts (‘dirty’ aid). First, it tests whether environmental aid as a proportion of donor portfolios reflects their broader environmental preferences, as revealed in domestic environmental policy, ratification of international environmental treaties, and their compliance with these treaties. Second, it tests theories claiming that people change their values when they have satisfied their basic human needs. Third, it explores a political economy approach to aid allocation that suggests the relative strength of environmental NGO and industry lobbies in shaping the environmental profile of aid portfolios. Fourth, it tests propositions from new institutionalist theory by examining whether environmental aid is influenced by the number of checks and balances in government and whether there is a corporatist or pluralist decision-making structure within a donor polity.

Keywords:   bilateral environmental aid, donors, political economy, institutionalist theory, corporatist, pluralist, environmental NGO, industry lobbies

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