Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Beloved SelfMorality and the Challenge from Egoism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alison Hills

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199213306

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 September 2019

Epistemic Rationality

Epistemic Rationality

Chapter:
(p.169) 8 Epistemic Rationality
Source:
The Beloved Self
Author(s):

Alison Hills (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0008

There are some striking differences between the way in which we form beliefs about moral matters and the way we form beliefs about non-moral matters of fact. We do not suspend judgements about moral disagreements as we do in response to disagreements about non-moral matters. We do not trust moral testimony as we do testimony about non-moral matters. And there are no moral experts, as there are experts on non-moral matters. Is this treatment of moral questions epistemically rational? This chapter argues that there is a connection between the standards of epistemic rationality for beliefs and the function of those beliefs in action. The standards of epistemic rationality for non-moral beliefs are related to knowledge, because actions based on knowledge typically are successful.

Keywords:   epistemic rationality, moral testimony, moral experts, knowledge, action

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .