There are some striking differences between the way in which we form beliefs about moral matters and the way we form beliefs about non-moral matters of fact. We do not suspend judgements about moral disagreements as we do in response to disagreements about non-moral matters. We do not trust moral testimony as we do testimony about non-moral matters. And there are no moral experts, as there are experts on non-moral matters. Is this treatment of moral questions epistemically rational? This chapter argues that there is a connection between the standards of epistemic rationality for beliefs and the function of those beliefs in action. The standards of epistemic rationality for non-moral beliefs are related to knowledge, because actions based on knowledge typically are successful.
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