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Being ReducedNew Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation$
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Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199211531

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001

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Exclusion Again *

Exclusion Again *

(p.280) 14 Exclusion Again*
Being Reduced

Karen Bennett (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter maintains that the non-reductive physicalist's best strategy for avoiding the causal exclusion argument, as defended in Bennett (2003), is unavailable to dualists. One strategy for denying the underlying exclusion principle is to focus on the notion of causation in play, i.e. to reject an oomphy notion of causation in favour of something along the lines of a pure counterfactual dependence notion. The other strategy focuses on the relation between the causes. In the relevant cases, the causes are causally sufficient for the same effect, but are tightly related in some way that defuses the threat of overdetermination. Only the latter strategy works, but it is unavailable to the dualist.

Keywords:   non-reductive physicalism, dualism, causal exclusion argument, exclusion principle, causal overdetermination, counterfactual dependence, production, causation

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