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The Possibility of Knowledge$
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Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199208319

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001

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Perceptual Knowledge (II): Concepts

Perceptual Knowledge (II): Concepts

Chapter:
(p.129) 4 Perceptual Knowledge (II): Concepts
Source:
The Possibility of Knowledge
Author(s):

Quassim Cassam (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0004

This chapter examines the suggestion that the a priori enabling conditions for epistemic perceiving include not just narrowly perceptual capacities, but also the capacity to think in certain ways; specifically, they include the capacity to think categorially. This is the point referred to in previous chapters as the Categorial Thinking Requirement (CTR). Categorial thinking is thinking by means of categorial concepts, and what CTR implies is that coming to know that a proposition about the external world is true by perceiving that it is true depends on one's possession of certain specific categorial concepts.

Keywords:   object perception, Categorical Thinking Requirement, epistemic perception, foundations, minimalism

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