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The Possibility of Knowledge$
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Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199208319

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001

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Transcendental Arguments

Transcendental Arguments

Chapter:
(p.51) 2 Transcendental Arguments
Source:
The Possibility of Knowledge
Author(s):

Quassim Cassam (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0002

This chapter examines the proposal that the best way to answer an epistemological how-possible question is by means of a transcendental argument. Although it might appear that transcendental arguments are closely related to the multi-levels response to how-possible questions, it is argued that they are different from each other and that the latter response is better. It remains to be seen whether transcendental arguments have any legitimate role in epistemology, but the point is that it is a mistake to think that their role is to explain how knowledge is possible. Transcendental arguments aren't necessary if the object of the exercise is to answer an epistemological how-possible question, and they aren't sufficient either.

Keywords:   generality, knowledge, revelation, validation, explanation, how-possible questions, multi-levels response

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