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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation$
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Debraj Ray

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199207954

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001

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(p.1) CHAPTER 1 Introduction
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Debraj Ray (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This introductory chapter describes the problem studied in the remainder of the book: what happens when a group of agents get together to write one or more agreements. If a subgroup forms a coalition, they act cooperatively by choosing and implementing a joint course of action. However, the actions of different coalitions are chosen independently and non-cooperatively. This book is interested in the equilibrium of coalition formation. Which coalitions will come about? Is there a presumption that such coalition formation will be efficient? If so, under what circumstances will they be efficient? If not, can one place bounds on the extent of inefficiency that may occur?

Keywords:   agreements, coalitions, coalition formation, non-cooperation, efficiency, externalities

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