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The Metaphysics of Knowledge$
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Keith Hossack

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199206728

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001

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Consciousness

Consciousness

Chapter:
(p.169) 5 Consciousness
Source:
The Metaphysics of Knowledge
Author(s):

Keith Hossack (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.003.0005

This chapter applies the metaphysics of knowledge to the mind, the other relatum of the knowledge relation. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the problem of introspective self-knowledge, and Section 2 introduces the problem of consciousness. Section 3 discusses the considerations that might lead us to posit qualia as real universals. Section 4 discusses the problem of the necessary co-occurrence of a conscious state and the consciousness of it. Section 5 introduces Reid's Identity Thesis and restates it in terms of the metaphysics of this book. Section 6 suggests that the Identity Thesis has some important advantages. Section 7 argues that it is an objection to functionalism that it is inconsistent with the Identity Thesis.

Keywords:   self-knowledge, qualia, co-occurrence, Identity Thesis, functionalism, Thomas Reid

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