This chapter continues the analysis of Spinozism. It focuses on Schleiermacher's long discussion of personal identity, which is extremely significant for Schleiermacher's later understanding of reflective self-consciousness. In it Schleiermacher reveals himself to be intimately acquainted with both Kant's transcendental deduction as well as Kant's chapter on the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Schleiermacher argues, in agreement with Kant, that we have no access to a substantial noumenal self. Rather, identity of the subject is cognizable only in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. The only reflective access we have to self is through the products of its transcendental activity; the transcendental activity itself, however, cannot become an object for consciousness but is only given in immediacy. The philosophical position Schleiermacher develops here is key to gaining an understanding of the position he develops in the Monologen.
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