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Transformation of the Self in the thought of Schleiermacher$
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Jacqueline Mariña

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199206377

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206377.001.0001

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The Principle of Individuation

The Principle of Individuation

(p.43) 2 The Principle of Individuation
Transformation of the Self in the thought of Schleiermacher

Jacqueline Mariña (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the grounds for the younger Schleiermacher's claim in Spinozism that there are no genuine individuals. Making extensive use of Kant's philosophy, Schleiermacher defends Spinoza's claim that there can be only one genuine substance. His argument is conducted in light of Jacobi's presentation of Leibniz' system. The first part of the chapter discusses Schleiermacher's epistemological arguments against the knowability of Leibniz' principle of individuation. The second part of the chapter provides an analysis of Schleiermacher's metaphysical arguments against the existence of a genuine plurality of individuals.

Keywords:   individuals, Kant, Leibniz, Jacobi, Spinoza, epistemology, metaphysics, substance, noumena, phenomena

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