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The Rationality of Perception$
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Susanna Siegel

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198797081

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.001.0001

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Epistemic Downgrade

Epistemic Downgrade

(p.57) 4 Epistemic Downgrade
The Rationality of Perception

Susanna Siegel

Oxford University Press

The examples used to motivate the Rationality of Perception pose the problem of hijacked experience. Part of the problem is that there is some pressure, on the face of it, to deny that these experiences have just as much power to provide justification as they could, if they were not influenced by the subject’s fears, suspicions, or prejudice. Chapter 4 defines the notion of epistemic power, and argues that experiences would indeed lose epistemic power in the cases that motivate the Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, this loss of epistemic power is called “epistemic downgrade.” It is the second conceptual ingredient needed to defend the Rationality of Perception.

Keywords:   cognitive penetration, dogmatism, perceptual justification, well-foundedness, ill-foundedness, epistemic power, epistemic downgrade, phenomenal conservatism, immediate justification

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