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The Rationality of Perception$
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Susanna Siegel

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198797081

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.001.0001

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The Problem of Hijacked Experience

The Problem of Hijacked Experience

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 The Problem of Hijacked Experience
Source:
The Rationality of Perception
Author(s):

Susanna Siegel

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.003.0001

Jill suspects that Jack is angry at her. But she doesn’t know that her suspicion will affect the way Jack looks when she sees him. If Jill’s suspicion that Jack is angry makes him appear angry, does her perceptual experience give her reason to strengthen her suspicion that he is angry?—Yes, because according to her visual experience, Jack looks angry to her. But No, because her suspicion is illicitly strengthening itself, via Jill’s experience. Both answers can seem plausible, and that is the problem of hijacked experience. Chapter 1 defines perceptual hijacking in general, explains the differences between hijacked experiences and other sorts of perceptual hijacking, and highlights the special epistemological problem posed by hijacked experiences.

Keywords:   epistemic circularity, hijacked perception, cognitive penetration, perceptual justification, weight of evidence, epistemic weight

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