Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Constitutional Preferences and Parliamentary ReformExplaining National Parliaments' Adaptation to European Integration$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas Winzen

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198793397

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793397.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 January 2020

Constitutional Preferences and National Parliamentary Reform

Constitutional Preferences and National Parliamentary Reform

Chapter:
(p.40) 3 Constitutional Preferences and National Parliamentary Reform
Source:
Constitutional Preferences and Parliamentary Reform
Author(s):

Thomas Winzen

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793397.003.0003

There is something puzzling about parliamentary oversight competences in EU affairs and domestic policy-making alike. The majority parties that would have the voting power to create these competences do not urgently need them, while the opposition parties that need institutional rights lack the votes to get them. This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of existing explanations of national parliaments’ institutional adaptation to European integration, such as those of accounts based on party political incentives arising from minority and coalition governance. It then elaborates an alternative account, relating EU-related parliamentary reforms to the nature and configuration of political parties’ constitutional preferences.

Keywords:   European integration, national parliaments, constitutional preferences, institutional adaptation, political parties

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .