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Oxford Studies in Metaethics11$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198784647

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.001.0001

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Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements

Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements

Chapter:
(p.155) 7 Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements
Source:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Author(s):

Justin Snedegar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0007

The reasons first approach holds that all other normative concepts can be explained by reasons. It promises to unify the normative domain, telling us what makes any normative concept normative. But the reasons first theorist then has to give us analyses of all other normative concepts in terms of reasons. Though there is a natural account of “ought” in terms of reasons, analyses of other concepts are more difficult. The distinction between what you ought and what you are required to do necessitates a reasons first account of requirement that respects this distinction. The Two Kinds of Reasons strategy appeals to one kind of reason that explains oughts and one that explains requirements. But while the concepts are distinct, they bear important structural relationships to one another which the Two Kinds of Reasons strategy threatens to miss. After two existing implementations are rejected, a potential way forward is suggested.

Keywords:   normativity, requirement, ought, reasons first, reasons

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