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The Coherence of TheismSecond Edition$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198779698

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779698.001.0001

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(p.150) 9 Omnipotent
The Coherence of Theism

Richard Swinburne

Oxford University Press

Both simultaneous and backward causation are logically impossible. S is omnipotent during some period of time T iff, in each sub-period within T, S knows of all logically necessary propositions and of all logically contingent true propositions about every time earlier than the beginning of that sub-period and of all the propositions that those propositions entail, that they are true; he is not influenced by non-rational influences; and is able to cause by an act beginning at any instant t and ending at any instant t2, both during that period, any logically contingent event M beginning at any instant t1 later than t and ending at t2, which does not require him to be influenced by non-rational influences. It is logically possible that there is an omnipotent person. Necessarily an omnipotent person is omnipresent, perfectly free, and creator of the universe.

Keywords:   backward causation, God, omnipotence, omniscience, paradox of the stone, simultaneous causation

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