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Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America$
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Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198777861

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.001.0001

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Strong Presidents, Weak Parties, and Agenda Setting

Strong Presidents, Weak Parties, and Agenda Setting

Lawmaking in Democratic Peru

Chapter:
(p.175) 7 Strong Presidents, Weak Parties, and Agenda Setting
Source:
Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America
Author(s):

Aldo F. Ponce

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.003.0007

This chapter examines the distribution of legislative agenda setting power in Peru. It confirms the conventional view that the president is a key actor in the lawmaking process. It shows that executive bills are more likely to pass than other initiatives, even when the president lacks a majority in Congress, and that presidents frequently enact legislative decrees. The analysis reveals a positive association between the use of legislative decrees and the legislative success of the president, which is consistent with the theory of “delegation.” In this particular context, both legislative paralysis between the executive and congressional players and any political crises as a consequence of the lack of majority of the president have been avoided. The chapter also shows that legislative productivity seems relatively unaffected by the lack of a majority government, and that arguments that claim the necessity of greater presidential powers do not seem applicable to the Peruvian case.

Keywords:   Peru, agenda setting, legislative success, legislative productivity, minority government, decree power

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