Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198777861

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 September 2019

Presidential Agenda Authority in Plurality-Led Congresses

Presidential Agenda Authority in Plurality-Led Congresses

Agenda Setting Prerogatives without Majority Support

Chapter:
(p.32) 2 Presidential Agenda Authority in Plurality-Led Congresses
Source:
Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America
Author(s):

Ernesto Calvo

Iñaki Sagarzazu

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777861.003.0002

Presidents with plurality support in congress are among the most pervasive and less studied phenomena in Latin America. Often conflated with divided government, where an organized opposition controls a majority in congress, presidents whose allies control fewer than 50 percent of the seats still benefit from institutional resources to facilitate the consideration and approval of their preferred legislation. Gatekeeping authority without majority support forces the president’s allies to take advantage of existing congressional rules in ways that differ significantly from contexts in which they have majority support on the plenary floor. As this chapter shows, the strategic use of rules to approve presidential initiatives differs in majority-led or plurality-led congresses. Indeed, partisan, institutional, and positional effects interact with each other so that, even if and when rules remain unchanged, lawmaking patterns will differ across partisan contexts in congress.

Keywords:   Argentina, cartel theory, committee authority, legislative success, legislative rules, minority president

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .