Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Arguments about AbortionPersonhood, Morality, and Law$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Kate Greasley

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198766780

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 June 2020

Gradualism and Human Embodiment

Gradualism and Human Embodiment

Chapter:
(p.147) 7 Gradualism and Human Embodiment
Source:
Arguments about Abortion
Author(s):

Kate Greasley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.003.0008

This chapter restates the reasons arguments for believing that our concept of a person has chiefly to do with a cluster of sophisticated cognitive and emotional capacities, and the perennial problem that not all human beings post birth possess all of those characteristics. It argues that some rejections of the so-called ‘developmental’ (capacities-based) view of personhood’s conditions use the wrong test for conceptual salience—that is, they wrongly hold that every constitutive feature of personhood must also be an essential feature of all persons. It also seeks to explain why fetuses, which do not possess any of the core capacities definitive of persons, can nevertheless be owed increasing moral respect as they develop throughout gestation on account of their burgeoning human embodiment.

Keywords:   fetal personhood, moral status, human fetus, gestation, abortion, moral respect, human embodiment

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .