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Arguments about AbortionPersonhood, Morality, and Law$
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Kate Greasley

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198766780

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.001.0001

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What Should Abortion Argument Be About?

What Should Abortion Argument Be About?

Chapter:
(p.11) 1 What Should Abortion Argument Be About?
Source:
Arguments about Abortion
Author(s):

Kate Greasley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198766780.003.0002

This chapter deals introduces the question about what is truly contentious in the abortion debate. It considers personhood-bypassing challenges that proceed by claiming that the personhood question is a fundamentally misconceived starting point for philosophical discussion and/or legal reasoning about abortion. It asks whether such challenges are at all convincing. In short, is there reason to throw out the personhood question in the very early stages of our moral thinking about abortion? It examines Ronald Dworkin’s view that the abortion argument is not, at root, about whether or not the fetus is a person in the philosophical sense, but rather about different ideas concerning the intrinsic value of human life.

Keywords:   abortion, fetal personhood, moral thinking, moral status, human fetus, Ronald Dworkin

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